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Résumé / Abstract
Nous analysons un jeu entre deux ports, dont le premier a l’avantage de
prendre sa décision avant son adversaire. Dans chaque port, il y a un cartel qui
s'occupe de la distribution des biens produits par des établissements localisés entre
les deux ports. Les cartels prennent comme donnée l'infrastructure construite par
les gouvernements respectifs qui se font concurrence. On démontre que l'un des
deux gouvernements a intérêt à utiliser la stratégie de «préemption» en
investissant très généreusement en infrastructure.
This paper examines how two geographically separated ports compete for
a market consisting of manufacturing firms located between the two ports. There
is a firm in each port, and these two firms, taking the infrastructure provided by
their governments as given, compete in a Bertrand sense. The governments,
however, can also compete in terms of investment in infrastructure. This paper
shows that there are cases in which both the firm and the government in the port
that has a longer history in the market may have the first mover advantage. In
particular, the government can provide a credible threat by overinvesting in
infrastructure.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a model of rivalry between two cities that are distribution
centres for goods produced in a long narrow region connecting the two cities.
Rivalry between cities is a common feature of economic life. An example
that comes immediately to mind is the potential rivalry between Hong Kong
and Shanghai. There are many other examples in the world that t the
present description. For example, in the United States, San Francisco and
Los Angeles, and Seattle and Tacoma have long histories of competition.
In Australia, Sydney and Melbourne have been known to be rivals for a
long time, both in the commercial and in the cultural spheres. In Canada,
Montreal and Toronto used to be (almost) equal competitors. In Germany,
Dresden and Leipzig have a long history of rivalry. Hong Kong and Singapore
are possible contenders for being the principal nancial centre for East and
Southeast Asia (not including Japan.)
When cities compete, the respective city governments may have an in-
centive to interfere, possibly to help locally based rms. This may reect the
desire of each city to maximize a conventional social (or, rather, city-based)
welfare function. Alternatively, one may adopt the political-economy view
that city oÆcials want to be reelected, and their campaign funds can be in-
creased if they help local businesses (possibly at the expenses of local tax
payers.)
Our paper is an attempt to model the commercial rivalry between two
cities. We abstract from considerations such as population size, agglomera-
tion eects, labor market externalities, or diversication of business activi-
ties
1
. Our main focus is on the investment in city infrastructure, such as the
road system, the law enforcement and regulatory system (e.g., how eective
is the body that regulates the activities of the city stock exchange in Hong
Kong, as compared with Singapore?). We model the rivalry between the two
cities as follows. We assume that in each city there is a single distributor
(or a cartel of distributors). The two distributors compete in service prices
that they oer to manufacturing rms that are located in a long, narrow re-
gion joining the two cities. Each distributor's cost of supplying distribution
services depends on the quality of the city's infrastructure, the provision of
which is the responsibility of the city's government. The two governments
compete against each other, because each wants its city to be the most pros-
perous centre of commerce
In the model considered in the present paper, there are two levels of
1
For models that deal with these issues, see, for example, North (1955), Thisse (1987),
Glaeser et al. (1992), Fujita and Thisse (1996), Long and Soubeyran (1998), and Fujita
et al. (1999)
1
competition, which take place consecutively. First, the governments of the
cities compete in terms of investment in infrastructure. Then, taking the
government investments as given, the two distributors compete. On the
rm level, we examine both a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium and a Stackelberg
leader-follower equilibrium between the two distributors. The latter equilib-
rium is the one the distributor that develops earlier wants to achieve, but
its successful achievement of this equilibrium depends on certain restrictive
assumptions. On the government level, a Nash equilibrium is possible if the
cities are symmetric. However, if a city is developed earlier, it has the rst
mover advantage so that when a rival city tries to emerge with possible jumps
in infrastructure investments, it has an incentive to increase its investment
with the purpose of discouraging the investment by its rival. Such a preemp-
tive investment by the rst mover could be credible because investment that
was made earlier is not reversible.
In section 2 we present the basic model and determine the equilibrium
when one of the ports is the only supplier of the distribution services to the
production rms. In section 3, we characterize the Nash-Bertrand equilib-
rium between two distributors, one located in each city. Section 4 analyzes
the case in which one distributor has the rst mover advantage, that is, this
is a Stackelberg game between the two distributors. Section 5 studies the
optimal unilateral intervention from the point of view of one city, under the
assumption that the two distributors play a Nash-Bertrand game. In sec-
tion 6, we deal with a simultaneous-move game between the two cities, while
section 7 discusses the Stackelberg game between the two cities. In both of
these sections, we maintain the assumption that the two distributors play a
Nash-Bertrand game. The last section oers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The two cities are denoted by N and S (North and South), respectively.
2
The
distance between them is normalized at unity. S is located at point 0 and N
is located at point 1. There are two types of rms: production rms, and
distribution rms. Production rms form a continuum, and are uniformly
distributed between S and N. A production rm is indexed by x; where x is
its distance from S and 1 x is its distance from N. These rms produce the
2
Our convention of naming the two cities comes from the fact that in many of the
examples cited earlier, the two cities are roughly in a North-South positions; for example,
Hong Kong-Shanghai, Seattle-Tacoma, and San Francisco-Los Angeles.
2
same good.
3
For simplicity, assume that each production rm produces either one unit
of output, or nothing. The cost of producing the output is a given constant,
which is normalized as zero. The cost to rm x of shipping its output from
location x to S is bx
2
=2, and the cost of shipping the output from location x
to N is (b=2)(1  x)
2
.
4
In city S, there is a single distribution rm labeled distributor S (or,
equivalently, a cartel of distributors) that provides the service of sending
(and marketing) the goods to a foreign market. The cost of providing this
service is C
S
per unit of good sold, which is taken as given by the distributor.
The cost C
S
depends on the quality of the city's infrastructure, I
S
; (such as
the quality of the road network, and of the law enforcement system), as
described by the following function,
C
S
= C
S
(I
S
);
where C
0
S
(I
S
) < 0 and C
00
S
(I
S
) > 0:
5
It should be noted that I
S
is labeled as
investment for simplicity, but it is in fact the accumulated investment in the
past less depreciation. It is therefore a stock, not a ow.
Distributor charges a price 
S
 C
S
; the same for all production rms,
for its distribution service.
6
The world price of the good is P , assumed to be
given exogenously.
In city N, there is a rival distributor labeled distributor N, with unit cost
of distribution C
N
given by
C
N
= C
N
(I
N
);
where C
0
N
(I
N
) < 0; C
00
N
(I
N
) > 0:
3 Monopoly Distributor
We begin by focusing on one distributor. Suppose that initially the cost of
the rival distributor in N is so high that it cannot compete with distributor
S; e.g., the quality level I
N
is so low that C
N
(I
N
) > P: Then the southern
distributor is a monopolist.
3
Many features of this model are borrowed from the spatial competition model of
Hotelling (1927).
4
Our assumption that the transport cost is quadratic in distance is in line with
d'Aspremont et al. (1979).
5
This means that an increase in the quality of the city's infrastructure will lower the
cost of the distribution service, but the rate of change in C
S
with respect to I
S
increases
with the latter.
6
Charging the same price to all production rms implies no price discrimination by
each distribution rm.
3
3.1 Optimal Production of Distributor S
The objective of distributor S is to maximize its prot by choosing a service
price 
S
and a cut o point x
m
 1 such that all rms with distance x > x
m
will be excluded. For rms that are not excluded, the participation constraint
is that they should earn non-negative prot. Formally, the distributor seeks
to
max

S
;x
m

S
=
Z
x
m
0
(
S
  C
S
)dx = (
S
  C
S
)x
m
; (1)
subject to
P   
S
 
b
2
x
2
 0; 8x 2 [0; x
m
]; (2)
and
0  x
m
 1: (3)
It is convenient to dene the mark-up on distribution cost as z,
z = 
S
  C
S
: (4)
It is clear that problem (1) is equivalent to
max
z;x
m

S
= zx
m
; (5)
subject to (3) and
P   C
S
  z  
b
2
(x
m
)
2
 0: (6)
To analyze problem (5), we make use of Figure 1. In the (x; z) space, we
rst construct various iso-prot contours, each of which corresponds to the
same prot. Each iso-prot contour, such as XZ, has a slope of
@z
@x





XZ
=  
z
x
< 0; (7)
and is convex to the origin. Condition (6) is the area bounded from above
by curve PC, which has a slope of
@z
@x





PC
=  bx < 0; (8)
and is concave to the origin. Constraint (3) refers to the region bounded
by the vertical axis and the vertical line x = 1: The problem of the rm
is to choose (x; z) that reaches the highest iso-prot contour subject to the
constraints (6) and (3). Depending on the nature of the solution, two cases
can be distinguished.
4
The Whole Market Case (Corner Solution) | This case, in which
distributor S serves all the production rms, is dened by the following con-
dition:
P   C
S

3b
2
: (9)
To see why there is a corner solution, note that at x
m
= 1; conditions (9)
and (6) (the latter with an equality) imply that at (1; P   C
S
  b)
@z
@x





PC

@z
@x





XZ
; (10)
or that contour XZ is at least as steep as curve PC. This is the case shown
in Figure 1 (with a strict inequality in condition (10)). The optimal point
with the highest possible prot is E.
At this point, condition (6) implies that the optimal price of the good is


S
= P   b=2; giving a prot to the rm of

SM
= 

SC
(C
S
) = P   C
S
 
b
2
: (11)
The Partial Market Case (Interior Solution) | This case, in which
distributor S serves some of the production rms closer to itself, is dened
by the following condition:
P   C
S
<
3b
2
: (12)
Let us suppose that starting from point E there is a drop in the price P;
or a rise in the cost C
S
; or both, so that curve PC shifts down to, say,
~
P
~
C;
satisfying condition (12). This produces a point of tangency,
~
E, between
~
P
~
C and iso-prot contour
~
X
~
Z, it is optimal for distributor S to serve all
the production rms within the interval (0, ~x): Using (7) and (8), with (6)
holding as an equality, we get the solution to the prot-maximizing problem:
z

= 2(P   C
S
)=3; and
x
m
=
q
2(P   C
S
)=(3b) (13)


S
=
2P + C
S
3
: (14)
Firm S is able to get a prot of
5
SM
= 

SI
(C
S
) =
1
p
b
"
2(P   C
S
)
3
#
3=2
; (15)
which is what contour
~
X
~
Z represents. Note that in these two cases with all
production rms as price takers distributor S will set the service price 
S
so
that the production rm being served and farthest away from port S earns a
zero prot.
3.2 Optimal Investment by Government S
The government of port S is to choose the optimal investment in infras-
tructure, I
S
, which determines the cost of distribution rm S takes as given.
The government chooses I
S
to maximize the welfare function V
S
of the port
dened as
V
S
= 
SM
  (1 + )I
S
; (16)
where  is the marginal cost of public nance
7
, and 
SM
is the prot of the
distribution rm as a monopolist, dened by either (11) or (15) depending
on whether an interior solution exists. Problem (16) yields the rst order
condition

0
SM
(C
S
)C
0
S
(I
S
) = (1 + ): (17)
In condition (17), 
0
SM
(C
S
) =  1 and 
00
SM
(C
S
) = 0 in the Whole Market
case, or 
0
SM
(C
S
) =  
q
2(P   C
S
)=(3b) and 
00
SM
(C
S
) = [2=(3b)]
1=2
[P  
C
S
]
 1=2
in the Partial Market case.
When given the market price of the good, condition (17) is illustrated by
schedule ABFDE in Figure 2. This schedule has two components. Segment
ABFD is a vertical line, corresponding to the Whole Market case (C
S
<
P 3b=2); in which (17) reduces to an equation with one unknown, I
S
: Denote
the unique solution by I
0
S
: Curve DE corresponds to the Partial Market case
(C
S
> P   3b=2): Condition (17) is dierentiated to give the slope of curve
DE:
dC
S
dI
S





DE
=  

0
SM
C
00
S
C
0
S

00
SM
< 0: (18)
Also illustrated in Figure 2 is schedule CI, which represents C
S
= C
S
(I
S
);
which, by assumption, is downward sloping and convex to the origin. The
intersection between schedules ABFDE and CI gives the optimal infrastruc-
ture investment. At the initial market price, the optimal point occurs at F in
7
It measures the deadweight loss caused by raising an extra dollar of tax.
6
the gure, with an infrastructure investment of I
0
S
; leading to a service cost
of C

S
: Distributor S chooses to serve the whole market.
8
Suppose now that there is a signicant decrease in P to, say,
~
P : As a
result, the curve that represents condition (17) shifts to AB
~
FG, with its
portion B
~
FG corresponds to the case in which distributor S serves only part
of the market. With the slope in (18) suÆciently large in magnitude, B
~
FG
cuts schedule CI at point
~
F, leading to an optimal infrastructure investment
of
~
I
0
S
and a corresponding service cost of
~
C

S
:
9
Making use of Figure 2 and
the previous analysis, the following proposition can easily be established, the
proof of which is given in the appendix:
Proposition 1: (a) If currently C
S
 P   3b=2; a small rise in P will not
aect the government's infrastructure investment while distributor S contin-
ues to serve the whole market. The service price charged by distributor S
increases by the same amount. (b) If currently C
S
> P  3b=2; a small rise in
P will lead to an increase in the government's infrastructure investment and
a fall in the service cost, while distributor S serves more rms. The change in
the service price charged by distributor S is determined by condition (14).
10
4 Duopoly in Distribution
Now consider the duopoly case, in which both distributors S and N may
provide services to the production rms. These two distributors set service
prices, 
S
and 
N
; respectively. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the
8
As an example, one may take the special functional form
C
S
(I
S
) =

S
I
S
;
where 
S
is a positive parameter. Assumingt that the market price is high enough so that
rm S serves the whole market, we obtain the optimal investment condition
I
S
=


S
1 + 

1=2
:
9
To satisfy the second-order condition, schedule GB is steeper than schedule CI, as
shown in Figure 2. See the appendix for a proof.
10
Note that for simplicity we have not explicitly imposed the condition that investment
is irreversible, i.e., I
S
 0. Under irreversibility, there is an asymmetry between an
increase in P and a decrease in P: While a government may be interested in increasing
its investment in response to an increase in P; it does not destroy some of its previous
investment in the case of a drop in P:
7
market price is high enough so that if one distributor serves the market, it
serves the whole market (the Whole Market case).
11
Production rms take the service prices 
N
and 
S
as given, and choose
the distributor with the lower distribution cost. Denote x
c
as the rm indif-
ferent between dealing with N or S, satisfying

S
+
bx
2
c
2
= 
N
+
b(1  x
c
)
2
2
;
or
x
c
=
1
2
+
1
b
(
N
  
S
) : (19)
Given that x
c
2 [0; 1]; three cases can be distinguished:
12
 Case S: 
N
  
S
 b=2. From (19), x
c
= 1; with all production rms
served by distributor S.
 Case N: 
S
  
N
 b=2, implying that x
c
= 0; with all production
rms served by distributor N .
 Case B: j
N
  
S
j < b=2: In this case, 0 < x
c
< 1; with distributor
S serving rms located at (0, x
c
) while distributor N serving those at
(x
c
; 1).
4.1 Reaction Functions of the Distributors
Dene y  
N
  
S
, and (y)  x
c
: Let us rst consider distributor S, which
maximizes its prot, taking 
N
as given:

S
=
Z
(y)
0
(
S
  C
S
)dx = (
S
  C
S
)(y); (20)
subject to
P   
S
  b[(y)]
2
=2  0: (21)
Condition (21), which makes sure that all production rms served by the
distributor do not have negative prots, is assumed to be not binding. The
reaction curve of distributor S is derived as follows and is illustrated in Figure
3:
Case N (region A): In this region, (y) = 0, and is bounded below by
the line XKL, 
S
= 
N
+ (b=2), with distributor S serving no rm.
11
This simplies the analysis and guarantees interactions between the two distributors.
12
In all these cases, the market price is assumed to be high enough so that no production
rms concerned make a loss.
8
Case S (region B): In this region, (y) = 1 and is bounded above by the
line, YJGH, 
S
= 
N
  (b=2); with distributor S capturing the whole market.
Note that 
S
= P   b=2; the monopolistic service price, when 
N
 P:
Case B (region D): In this region, (y) 2 (0; 1); and is bounded by
lines XKL and YJGH. The reaction function in this region is obtained from
the solution to problem (20) and is given by

S
= R
S
(
N
) =
b
4
+
1
2
[C
S
+ 
N
] : (22)
In the diagram, the line represented by (22) cuts YJGH at point G, where

N
= C
S
+(3=2)b. Combining the above results, we conclude that the reaction
curve of distributor is given by schedule EFGHI in Figure 3. We now have
the following interesting result:
Proposition 2 (Limit Pricing): Assume that condition (9) holds. If
distributor N charges 
N
so that P > 
N
> C
S
+ (3=2)b; then distributor
S will charge a service price that captures the whole market for itself. This
service price is below the monopoly price.
Note that in Proposition 2, condition (9) implies that distributor S as a
monopolist will capture the whole market. If P > 
N
> C
S
+ (3=2)b; the
distributor's reaction curve is given by GH in Figure 3. The corresponding
service price charged by S is less than the monopolist price, P   b=2; but
S captures the whole market with distributor N serving no production rm.
This case is interesting as the presence of distributor N poses as a threat to
distributor S, who chooses to set a price lower than the monopolist price.
On the other hand, distributor S sets a price low enough to deter N from
entering the market.
The reaction function for distributor N can be constructed in a similar
way. If it has a segment in the interior of region D, then that segment satises
the following equation

N
=
b
4
+
1
2
[C
N
+ 
S
] (23)
We now derive the equilibrium. We assume that both distributors take the
infrastructure in each city (and thus its service cost and that of its competi-
tor) as given, and compete in a Bertrand fashion so that they simultaneously
choose a service price. The Nash equilibrium is described by the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 (Nash equilibrium): Assume that condition (9) holds: (a)
If C
N
 C
S
+(3=2)b; distributor S captures the whole market: In the subcase
9
in which C
N
< P; distributor S charges a service price of

S
= C
N
 
b
2
: (24)
If C
N
 P; distributor S will charge the monopoly price 
S
= P   (b=2).
(b) If C
N
< C
S
+ (3=2)b, and C
S
< C
N
+ (3=2)b, or more concisely,
jC
N
  C
S
j < (3=2)b; then we have an interior Nash equilibrium, satisfying
both conditions (22) and (23), and the equilibrium charges are


S
=
b
2
+
1
3
(2C
S
+ C
N
) ; (25)
and


N
=
b
2
+
1
3
(2C
N
+ C
S
) ; (26)
provided that P is suÆciently great so that the indierent production rm
x
c
earns non-negative prot.
13
(c) If C
S
 C
N
+(3=2)b; distributor N captures the whole market : In the
subcase in which C
S
< P; distributor N charges a service price of

N
= C
S
 
b
2
: (27)
If C
S
 P; distributor N will charge the monopoly price 
N
= P   (b=2).
Remarks: The above proposition indicates that (i) distributor S will use
the limit pricing strategy if C
N
is below P but is suÆciently greater than
C
S
(precisely, C
N
 C
S
+ (3=2)b). If C
N
falls, then the limit price 
S
,
given by (24) will also be adjusted downwards, and (ii) in the case where
both distributors have positive market shares, a fall in C
N
will cause both
equilibrium charges to fall, but 
S
falls by less than 
N
.
4.2 Services Costs and Nash Equilibrium
Construct a diagram (Figure 4) in the (C
N
; C
S
) space, for a given P; which
we assume to be greater than (3=2)b. We rst examine how Case S is
aected by the distributors' service costs. In region W
S
; which is dened by
C
N
> P > C
S
+(3=2)b, rm S is the monopoly that serves the whole market,
and its prot is

SM
= P   C
S
  (b=2) = 
SM
(C
S
); (28)
13
This condition requires that P  

S
+ (b=2)x
2
c
where x
c
= (1=2) + (1=3)b(C
N
  C
S
)
and where 

S
is as given above.
10
where the subscript M indicates that the distributor is in eect a full mo-
nopolist. In triangle T
N
; which is dened by (3=2)b < C
N
< P , 0 < C
S
<
P   (3=2)b, and C
S
< C
N
  3b=2; both distributors oer a service price less
than P , but distributor S captures the whole market by setting the limit
price 
SL
= C
N
  (b=2), thus earning the prot

SL
= 
SL
  C
S
= C
N
  C
S
  (b=2); (29)
where the subscript L indicates that the distributor is charging a limit price.
We now turn to case N. In region W
N
dened by C
S
> P > C
N
+ (3=2)b,
rm N is the monopoly that serves the whole market, and its prot is

NM
= P   C
S
  (b=2) = 
NM
(C
S
): (30)
Similarly, in triangle T
S
dened by (3=2)b < C
S
< P , 0 < C
N
< P   (3=2)b,
and C
N
< C
S
  3b=2; both distributors oer a service price less than P , but
distributor N captures the whole market by setting the limit price 
NL
=
C
S
  (b=2), thus earning the prot

NL
= 
NL
  C
N
= C
S
  C
N
  (b=2) > b: (31)
Finally, for case B, if the cost conguration (C
N
; C
S
) is in the region X
dened by the square f(C
N
; C
S
) : 0  C
N
 P , 0  C
S
 Pg excluding the
two triangles T
N
and T
S
and a small region Q in the north-east corner of
this square,
14
then we have a unique and interior Nash equilibrium, i.e., both
distributors have positive market shares. The market share of distributor S
at this equilibrium is
x
S
=
1
2
+
1
3b
[C
N
  C
S
] ;
and its Nash equilibrium prot is

nash
SI
= [
S
  C
S
]x
S
=
1
b
"
b
2
+
1
3
(C
N
  C
S
)
#
2
; (32)
where the subscript I indicates that the equilibrium is an interior one.
14
In the small region Q; the costs of both distributors are so close to P that some subset
of production rms are not served by either distributor. The lower boundary of Q is given
by the condition that the marginal production rm earns zero prot and is indierent
between the two distributors.
11
5 Stackelberg Leadership by A Distributor
In the preceding sections, it was assumed that the two distributors play a
Nash-Bertrand game, choosing their service prices simultaneously. There are,
however, some cases in which one of them can play as a Stackelberg leader.
One possible case is now described.
To describe such a possibility, let us rst investigate more properties of
the distributors' reaction curves. Consider Figure 5, which is obtained from
Figure 3, with some added details. Distributor S's reaction function in Figure
3 is reproduced in Figure 5, and is labelled JNKH, where K is the kink. The
co-ordinates of points J; K and H are respectively (0, C
S
=2+b=4), (C
S
+3b=2,
C
S
+b) and (P , P  b=2). In the region in which both distributors serve some
production rms (region D in Figure 3), the prot of distributor S is given
by

S
= [
S
  C
S
]x
c
= [
S
  C
S
]

1
2
+
1
b
(
N
  
S
)

: (33)
The loci of (
N
; 
S
) that give the same prot of distributor S, which can be
called an iso-prot contour, has the slope
@
S
@
N
=  
@
S
=@
N
@
S
=@
S
=
1
1  k
; (34)
where
k =
b + 2 (
N
  
S
)
2 [
S
  C
S
]
:
Note that the slope of an iso-prot contour at a point on line JK, part
of the distributor's reaction curve, is innity, implying that k = 1. This
further implies that the slope of the contour is positive (negative) above
(below) JK. In Figure 5, a Stackelberg equilibrium is depicted at point S,
where distributor N's reaction curve LNM is tangent to distributor S's iso-
prot curve 
s
S
, which is higher that what distributor S can get at a Nash
equilibrium. Since the slope of distributor N's reaction curve NM is equal to
2, k = 1=2 at point S.
Now suppose that currently the infrastructure investments by government
N is very low, making the service cost of distributor N very high, so that
distributor N chooses not to serve any production rms. So distributor S
is a monopolist and charges a service price of 
m
S
= P   b=2: Suppose now
that government invests signicantly in infrastructures, lowering distributor
N's service cost so that its reaction curve is now represented by LNSM in
Figure 5. If both distributors play Bertrand, the equilibrium is at point N.
Distributor S will observe a considerable drop in its service price (to 
n
S
) and
prot.
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Suppose now that, shortly before the entry of distributor N, distributor
S lowers its service price to 
s
S
; which is lower than 
m
S
but higher than 
n
S
:
If distributor N is convinced that this is what distributor S is committed to,
it will choose the Stackelberg point S.
There is, however, another possible case which is less intuitive. Suppose
that the service cost faced by distributor N is in fact higher so that its
reaction curve is
~
L
~
M in Figure 5. With this reaction curve, the Stackelberg
equilibrium shifts to a point like
~
S. In the case shown in the diagram, point
~
S
is above the horizontal line at P b=2; meaning that anticipating the entrance
of a rival distributor S raises its service price.
Such a case might seem counter-intuitive, but can be explained intuitively.
In the present model, while distributor S captures only part of the market
after the entrance of distributor N, when it raises its service price it antici-
pates that distributor N will react with a price at a level high enough so that
distributor S will not lose a big market share. This case can also be explained
in an alternative way. When a distributor is in a monopoly situation, there
is a trade-o between prot per unit of service sold, and the number of units
of service sold. When it has a rival as a follower, the trade-o is still there,
but it is somewhat altered: under monopoly, when a rm changes its price,
it is moving along a given demand curve described by x = [(2=b)(P  
S
)]
1=2
,
but with the existence of a follower, when distributor S changes its price, it
is moving along a quite dierent demand curve: x
c
= (1=2)+ (1=b)[
N
  
S
],
where 
N
= 
N
(
S
).
Of course, the Stackelberg equilibrium depends on the assumption that
distributor N is convinced that 
s
S
is irreversible. This would be the case
if distributor S chooses a service price and spends resources on xing and
announcing it. The more resources distributor S spends on xing the price,
the more costly it is to change it later, and the more convincing the pricing
policy is.
15
Usually the existing rm is in a better position in choosing the
service price rst, meaning that distributor S, being the rst in business, is
more likely to have the rst mover advantage. If, however, distributor N
believes that distributor S's chosen service price is reversible at low costs,
the more likely equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium.
A Numerical Example: This numerical example shows the possibility
that distributor S charges more in the duopoly case than in the monopoly
case. Let P = 2, C
S
= 0:5, C
N
= 1:2, and b = 1. The monopoly price
for distributor S is 1:5. At that price, it serves the whole market, and its
monopoly prot is 1. Now, consider the entry of distributor N. If S maintains
15
Of course, the cost of the resources on xing the price will come from the distributor's
prot.
13
the previous monopoly service price 
S
= 1:5, then N will charge 
N
= 1:6,
and S's market share will fall to 0:6, and its prot will be 
S
= 0:6. Clearly,
S can do better by maximizing (33) where 
N
= 
N
(
S
) as given by (23):
This yields 
S
= 1:60, and 
N
= 1:65, resulting in a smaller market share for
S, x
c
= 0:55 and a higher prot, 
S
= 0:605.
6 Optimal Unilateral Intervention
Assume that initially the costs are C
0
S
and C
0
N
; and the equilibrium is an
interior one, i.e., both distributors serve some production rms. Suppose
that the government of city S wants to maximize the welfare function V
S
by
choosing investment level I
S
, taking as given the amount I
N
. We assume
that government S rst chooses a new (possibly higher) investment level,
with government N remaining passive. Both distributors take the investment
levels as given and compete in a Bertrand fashion.
Let us assume that by spending I
S
> 0, the cost C
S
will fall to a level
below C
0
S
. This fall is represented by a function F
S
(I
S
), where F
S
(0) = 0,
F
0
S
(:) < 0, and F
00
S
(:) > 0, and C
S
= C
0
S
  F
S
(I
S
).
16
The government of city
S maximizes
V
S
=
1
b
"
b
2
+
1
3
(C
N
  C
S
)
#
2
  (1 + )I
S
: (35)
The rst-order condition is
dV
S
dI
S
=  !(I
N
; I

S
)F
0
S
(I

S
)  (1 + )  0, = 0 if I

S
> 0; (36)
where
!(I
N
; I

S
) =
1
3
+
1
9b

C
0
N
  F
S
(I
N
)  C
0
S
+ F
S
(I

S
)

> 0; (37)
and at an interior Nash equilibrium jC
N
  C
S
j < (3=2)b. It follows that
condition (36) is satised at some I

S
> 0 if jF
0
(0)j > (1 + )=!(I
0
N
; 0), that
is, if the rst dollar spent on investment has a very substantial marginal
eect on cost reduction. In what follows we assume that this is the case, so
that, given I
N
, at the optimal investment level I

S
, we have
F
0
(I

S
) =  (1 + )=!(I
N
; I

S
): (38)
The second-order condition is
d
2
V
S
dI
2
S
=  !(I
N
; I

S
)F
00
(I

S
) 
1
9b
[F
0
(I

S
)]
2
 
S
< 0; (39)
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Notice that it is assumed that the fall in cost is independent of the existing level of
cost. A more general formulation would have C
0
S
appear as a parameter in the function
F
S
:
14
which is satised.
Proposition 4: Assume that jF
0
S
(0)j > (1 + )=!(I
N
; 0). Then the opti-
mal policy for the government of S is to raise taxes to invest in the city's
infrastructure, until condition (38) is satised.
Remark: Because of upward sloping reaction functions, if we are considering
optimal output tax, we would get a result similar to that of Eaton and
Grossman (1986), who found that if a foreign rm and a home rm compete
in prices (and their reaction functions have positive slope) then the optimal
policy for the home government is to increase the cost of the home rm by
taxing its exports. In our model, we deal with modifying real costs, and the
optimal policy is to reduce the cost of the home rm, if the initial cost is high.
There are two features worth noting. Firstly, since the production rms that
are located on the long narrow region linking N and S are the purchasers of
the services, they are the analog of the consumers in the third market in the
Eaton-Grossman model. However, in our model, the \demand" for service
of S, given by (19), remains unchanged if both distributors slightly raise
their service prices by the same amount. This is not the case in the Eaton-
Grossman model. The second feature is that while in the Eaton-Grossman
model a dollar of subsidy reduces the cost of the home rm by a dollar,
in our model a dollar of spending in infrastructure reduces the cost of the
distributor by F
0
S
which is not a constant (recall that F
00
S
> 0).
7 Simultaneous Government Policies
Now suppose that both cities are engaged in the infrastructure-investment
game. The governments rst choose an investment level simultaneously.
Then the distributors, taking these investment levels as given, compete in
a Bertrand fashion.
For a given initial pair (C
0
S
; C
0
N
), let us nd the reaction function of each
city. From (36), we obtain city S's reaction function I
S
= r
S
(I
N
), with a
negative slope given by
dI
S
dI
N





S
 r
0
S
(I
N
) =
1

S
"
F
0
N
F
0
S
9b
#
< 0; (40)
where 
S
is dened in (39): By condition (40), the magnitude of the slope
is less than unity if jF
0
S
(I
S
)j  jF
0
N
(I
N
)j. The reaction function I
S
= r
S
(I
N
)
is illustrated in Figure 6. Note that there is a maximum value of city S's
investment, as represented by the at part AB of the reaction schedule.
15
This is the optimal investment of the government when distributor S is a
monopolist.
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Similarly, for city N, the reaction function of government N is I
N
=
r
N
(I
S
); which satises
dI
N
dI
S





N
 r
0
N
(I
S
) =
1

N
"
F
0
N
F
0
S
9b
#
< 0; (41)
where 
N
is dened in a similar way to 
S
above: The reaction function is
illustrated in Figure 6, with CD representing the maximum value of govern-
ment N's investment.
In general, there is the possibility of multiple equilibria, as illustrated in
Figure 6: If the initial costs C
0
S
and C
0
N
are identical, and the functions F
N
(:)
and F
S
(:) are the same, then there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium that
is stable, see point E
3
in Figure 6: However, there may exist non-symmetric
stable equilibria, such as points E
1
and E
5
.
In the case of multiple equilibria, it can be shown, by construction of
iso-welfare curves, V
i
= constant (i = S;N), that city N prefers E
5
to E
3
to
E
1
, and similarly, city S prefers E
1
to E
3
to E
5
.
In what follows, we will restrict attention to the case where there is only
one Nash equilibrium. We assume that such equilibrium is stable. See Figure
7, where the unique Nash equilibrium is E.
8 Stackelberg Game between Cities
As explained earlier, it is possible that one of the cities, say S, develops rst.
Suppose that initially city N has a very low investment in infrastructure,
such as I
0
N
so that distributor N cannot compete with distributor S.
18
In the
absence of active investment by city N, the government of S and distributor
S reach the monopoly equilibrium as described in Section 3: This equilibrium
can be represented by a point in between A and B in Figure 7. Note that
the investment by city N that corresponds to point B, denoted by I
B
N
in
Figure 7, is the one that will yield a service cost to distributor N equal to the
market price of the good, C
N
= P: With this service cost and market price,
distributor N will not want to provide any distribution service.
Suppose now that city N invests in infrastructure. What is the new equi-
librium? The reaction curve of city S is ABEF. Since city S develops earlier,
it has the rst mover advantage. Note that AB is a horizontal line, showing
17
Point B gives the value of I
N
that gives a service cost C
N
= P:
18
In other words, we assume that C
N
(I
0
N
) > P:
16
the maximum strategic investment of city S if it takes city N's investment as
given.
If city N decides to increase its infrastructure investment, we have to
consider its reaction curve. Suppose that at a lower service cost, its reaction
curve is represented by KLMECD as shown in the diagram. The intersecting
point between the two reaction curves, point E, gives the Nash equilibrium.
To reach this point, city S has to invest I
E
S
< I
0
S
; yielding a welfare of

V
S
to city S: Since infrastructure investment considered here is an accumulated
investment, it makes no sense to destroy some of the investment made pre-
viously. So city S will more likely keep the existing investment level. Taking
this as given, city N will react with an investment of I
M
N
; with the equilibrium
given by point M. City S will get a welfare level higher than

V
S
:
City S, however, can in general do better than point M. In Figure 7, one
of its iso-welfare contour, denoted by
^
V
S
; touches city N's reaction curve at
L. This is the Stackelberg point, with city S acting as the leader and city N
as the follower. Since city S has the rst mover advantage, it can increase its
investment level to I
L
S
at the time when city N is about to enter the market.
Reacting to this level, city N will choose the investment level I
L
N
: Thus city
S successfully achieves the welfare level
^
V
S
; which is higher than

V
S
:
It is often said that a Stackelberg equilibrium is not a likely outcome in an
oligopoly market because it is diÆcult for agents to make credible threats.
In this case, the threat made by city S is credible because the increase in
investment is not reversible.
In the above case with the Stackelberg equilibrium at L, city N enters
the market, makes some investment, and captures part of the market. Other
cases can be considered. Consider the case in which an iso-welfare contour
of city S touches N's reaction curve at point K or higher (instead of point L).
Starting from the monopoly case and anticipating the entrance of city N, city
S makes a preemptive move, increasing its investment to I
K
S
: In this case, city
N will have no incentive to invest because it does not make sense to make
distributor N competitive, recalling that with its investment corresponding
to point B or K, distributor N's service cost is at least as high as the market
price, P: This result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (Limit Investing): If city S has the rst mover advantage,
it can increase its investment to a level at which city N responds with zero
investment. There are cases in which city S will choose to increase its invest-
ment to a level to discourage city N from helping distributor N to enter the
market.
17
9 Concluding Remarks
We have modelled the rivalry between two cities, focussing on infrastructure
investment. We have shown that at the rm level, equilibrium may involve
limit pricing by a distributor. At the city level, preemptive investment by the
city that exists rst is possible. Such preemptive investment could discourage
the latecomer from entering the market.
There are a few issues that could be taken up in future research. Firstly,
what is the optimal cooperative outcome, where the cooperation may be
between the two cities, at the expense of the production rms in the long
narrow strip that join them? One can also involve the welfare of the owners of
these rms as well. Secondly, cities may compete in more than one dimension.
When the model is extended to allow for this, is it possible that the non-
cooperative equilibrium may maximize, rather than minimize, the dierence
between the two cities? Could it be the case that one city becomes a nancial
centre while the other becomes a goods distribution centre?
18
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof of part (a) is simple and is omitted.
To prove (b), write the rst-order condition (17) as
G(P; I
S
)  
0
SM
(C
S
(I
S
))C
0
S
(I
S
)  (1 + ) = 0: (42)
The second-order condition is
@G
@I
S
= (C
0
S
)
2

00
SM
+ 
0
SM
C
00
S
;
is assumed to be negative, i.e.,
 

0
SM
C
00
S
C
0
S

00
SM
< C
0
S
;
or in Figure 2, curve CI is less steep than the GB curve. The response of I
S
to an increase in P is obtained from (42):
dI
S
dP
=  
@G=@P
@G=@I
S
=

00
SM
C
0
S
(C
0
S
)
2

00
SM
+ 
0
SM
C
00
S
> 0: (43)
From (13), (14) and (43),
dx
m
dP
=
s
3b
8(P   C
S
)
 
1  C
0
S
dI
S
dP
!
> 0
d

S
dP
=
2
3
+
1
3
C
0
S
dI
S
dP
:
The sign of d

S
=dP is ambiguous.
19
References
[1] d'Aspremont, Claude J., Jean Gabszewicz, and Jacques-Francois Thisse
(1979), \On Hotelling's Stability in Competition," Econometrica, 17:
1145{51.
[2] Eaton, Jonathan, and Gene M. Grossman (1986), \Optimal Trade and
Industrial Policy under Oligopoly," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101:
385{406.
[3] Fujita, Masahisa and Jacques-Francois Thisse (1996), \Economics of Ag-
glomeration," Journal of International and Japanese Economies, 10 (4,
December): 339{78.
[4] Fujita, Masahisa, Paul Krugman, and Anthony J. Venebles (1999), The
Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and International Trade, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
[5] Glaeser, E., H.D. Kallal, J. A. Scheinkman, and A. Shleifer (1992),
\Growth in Cities," Journal of Political Economy, 100: 1126{56.
[6] Hotelling, Harold (1929), \Stability in Competition," Economic Journal,
39: 41-57.
[7] Long, Ngo Van and Antoine Soubeyran (1998), \R&D Spillovers and
Location Choice under Cournot Rivalry," Pacic Economic Review, 3
(2): 105{119.
[8] North, Douglas (1955), \Location Theory and Regional Economic
Growth," Journal of Political Economy, 62: 243{258.
[9] Thisse, Jacques-Francois (1987), \Location Theory, Regional Science, and
Economics," Journal of Regional Science, 27: 519{528.
20
OFigure 1
Monopoly: Optimal Market Size
P Cs
_
P Cs
_ _
b/2
1 x
X
Z
E
z
Z
~
E
~.
.
P Cs
_~ ~
P
P
CC
~
~
X
~
CS
IS
C
I
.
.P
_
3 2b/
F
F
~
A
B
D
E
G
CS*
CS*
~
P
_
3 2b/
~
Figure 2
Monopoly: Optimal Investment
IS
0IS
0~
Figure 3
Reaction Functions and Nash Equilibrium
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